The Mythologiques:
about the enunciadon position of the mythologist. Can he pretcnd to be an interpreter, able to fonnulate a signified {signifie) about the myths he studies? In other words: is it possible for him to claim a theorerical position, according to which he could explain what the myths mean? But to suppose this would be not to take seriously the fact that rr^ths do not aim at Sewing something but at producing it-, they work at setting up a world. What is, then, the task of the mythologist? This is Levi-Strauss' answer: he intervenes not as a commentator but as an performer of a piece of music. Just as the latter interprets a piece by playing it, so does the mythologist relate to the myths by narrating them or by developing them. But is this actually his only task? This shall be the ultimate issue of this discussion; because it is the actual status of critical knowledge that is at stake in this shift from a linguistic model to a musical model.
The methodological revival: the linguistic model
The revolution proposed by Le\H[-Strauss in his analysis of myths from 1955 onwards, seems at first similar to the one he performed in the domain of kinship. Here also, he invokes the linguistic model, first of all.
By rejecting the traditional types of Interpretation, which aimed at explaining a mythical narrative by focusing on the content alone (figures, actions, themes), Levi-Strauss performed a decisive revolution. He dismissed the p^chological explanations, according to which myths were expressions of our fundamental feelings and of our inner conflicts, as well as the purely sociological explanations, which assumed that myths only reflect the conditions and contradictions of a social group (even if this can make up one of the dimensions of myths), or even the symbolist interpretations, which claimed that myths express archetypes of human nature. He refused just as much the rationalist reductions, which turn myths into imaginal and somewhat naive transpositions of natural phenomena. Finally, he strongly questioned the Junctionalist theories, according to which myths would first and foremost translate the material needs of individuals and groups. Certain aspects of these different approaches can and even should be taken into account, but on the condidon of being considered in a completely different manner. For this, Levi-Strauss proposed to depart from this ver)' simple obvious fact: rr^ths an narratives, so they are Jacts of language. As narratives, they enunciate a succession of events. It is important first of all to understand what makes up the logic of their narration. Now, the latter seems obscure. What indeed strikes every reader of myths is the apparendy absurd or poindess nature of many episodes or details. The attempt to reduce this absurdity or this poindessness through interpretarions that apply to the characters or the images, in short, dedphering the contents on their own, would be to refer them to a meaning which would precede or go beyond narrative. Therefore, there would supposedly be a secret meaning only decipherable by subde Interpreters. For centuries there were enough candidates for this "hermeneutic illumination"; hence the different schools of Interpretation mentioned above. However, if instead of projecting external interpretative schemas we ask in the first place exacdy how the details and episodes of these narratives are related to the Clements of context, which are then linked to segments of other mythical narrations, then the narrative wholes tum out to be quite different: they organize the references to a given environment, but they do so within the more complex device of their links to other narratives. Sometimes they do so only on certain levels within those other narratives. These latter, in this network, may contradict or complete each other, oppose each other or repeat themselves, reply to, or invert each other. The contents are thus well summoned, but rather as semantic cores irradiating Clusters of relations in different groups of myths.
Two methodological concepts dominate this approach. The first is that of a ^stem (yet it would be recommendable to add to it that of a networ/^). At this level, the discipline that serves as a model is in fact linguistics, more precisely structural linguistics. The second major concept is that of tranrformation-, it stems both from mathematics and from the natural sciences. But, as we shall see in short, it is from music -thus from an art, from a practice -more than from a scholarly discipline, that Levi-Strauss demands a fiinctioning model. This choice is surprising and requires further explanation.
Yet let US retum to the linguistic model and point out what is essential about it. Levi-Strauss formulates the hypothesis that myths of the same cultural area form a system (as we say about language). Interpretation is to be found on this level: in the reciprocal relation of the narratives and their variations. Precisely while he reminded us of the three fundamental rules to observe in the act of analyzing myths, he defined an approach that was rigorously opposed to all ancient traditions of the gloss. These rules may be summarized as follows: 1) do not reduce a mythical narrative to just one of its levels; 2) do not isolate a myth from the group of other myths with which it is in a relation of transformation; 3) do not isolate a group of myths from the other groups of myths to which it is connected. In short, to understand a narrative within a given tradition is to seize, first of all, the entire set of other narratives that are linked to it; it is to situate it in a network.
Just like in the case of kinship systenis, for l^vi-Strauss what was at stake was not to ask structural linguistics for directly transcribable schemas, but rather to define an orientation of method. Such a request seemed more wellfounded because there was a very precise resemblance between the difficulties of traditional linguistics in the West and those of the Interpretation of myths. Traditional linguistics (understood as that of the philosophical reflection since Antiquity) searched for a relarion between sound and sense. A research fated to failure, since the same sounds can be found in different languages, associated to very different meanings. The methodological revolution was accomplished when the problem was put otherwise, i.e. when one understood that there could be no meaning in the sounds taken in isolation, but only in the rules of their combinations. The same goes for myths, explains Levi-Strauss: the themes and figures have no meaning in themselves (therefore, it is poindess to search for an archetypal or universal signification for them). Once again one needs to search for meaning in the rules of combination or composirion of the Clements. NaturaUy, this does not mean a pure and simple transposition of the method of linguistics to mythology. It is rather a model that allows one to situate terms in a system of relarions. Just like in the domain of kinship, the point was to think of the system as such, i.e. the priority (which does not mean the precedence) of the reladons over the terms. So in the case of myths, narrative ought to be considered as formed by consotuent units, whose relevance is determined by the system. But how are these units to be defined? What is the system in question?
Mythical narrative, as a fact of language, is subject as such to common linguistic analysis and on this level it reveals no more than any other linguistic utterance. However, precisely the sentence, which constitutes for linguistics the largest unit over which it can legislate, is on the contrary for discourse analysis, being the smallest unit from which it can devise combinations. The superior level of the one becomes the inferior level of the other. In short, is it not the sentence that ought to be treated by the mythologist as the phoneme by the linguist? That is to say, as an oppositional, relative and negative unit? But the sentence is a discursive unit. Thus the sentences "The bird sings" or "Socrates was a wise man" possess a meaning on their own: each of them is already a discourse. Now, by proposing to call nytheme the minimal narrative unit that defmes the level to which other levels can be reduced, Levi-Strauss intends to confer to it the status of a phoneme. So, the mytheme is not identical to the sentence any more than to the ward. It is not a linguistic entity, but it shares with it the logical form. It is not a signified or a theme either, but it is not separable from the figures that inhabit the narrative or from the motifs that abound in it. It is inseparable from both of these, and yet it is something eise. This is what makes the analysis difficult. The mytheme cannot be isolated as an object. It situates itself in the combinations and the transformations in which it is the recurrent element. Its existence is more logical than thematic, it consists of the Operation and the interplay of relations:
"In any hypothesis, one would be wrong to put the mytheme in the same category as the word or the sentence -entities whose meaning or meanings can be defmed, albeit ideally (for even the meaning of a myth varies with the context), and arranged in a dictionary. The elementary units of mythical discourse certainly consist of words and sentences, which -in this particular use and without overextending the analogy -are however more in the order of phonemes: meaningless units that are opposed within a system, where they create meanings precisely because of this Opposition". ^
The analog) of the ^theme mth the phoneme is thus of a purely methodoh^al nature.
In the analysis of myths such as he practices it, Levi-Strauss has not searched to systematically isolate the mythemes in order to then show their combinations.
The result of this would have been artificial, considering the plasticity of narratives and the richness of their metamorphoses. This gap between the announced method and the practiced method seemed to be an indication of a
difficulty not yet overcome. Many critics have stressed it, sometimes with severity; often also by revealing themselves incapable of taking into account the limits indicated by Levi-Strauss himself.
Taking the phoneme as a model could in fact present a risk in the sense that this unit is not only oppositional or relative, but especially negative, in short, it has no content of its own. The phoneme does not correspond to any signified.
It would seem absurd to say so much about the mytheme, except if we forget that here the analysis is not situated on the linguistic level, but on a completely different level: that of mythical discourse. Levi-Strauss, in fact, does not say that the mytheme is deprived of linguistic sense, he even expressly asserts the opposite.
In fact, everyone understands sentences like: "his head rolled and became a comet" or even "the hero climbed onto the tree and could not get back down".
\je RegardEloigne 199). [English translarion: The ViewfivmAfar{\^%S: 145).]
Levi-Strauss says only the following: a narrarive segment or a semantic dement of a myth (plant, animal, body part, mineral, tool, landscape, etc.) does not give US by itself any information outside the systeni where it occurs and outside the relations of transFormation in which it is inscribed. In this perspective, its status is analogous to that of the phoneme. This analogy allows the radicalization of the method with respect to previous approaches. It is on this level that the relarion with phonology is established and is limited. Otherwise, we see that the other resources of the linguistic disciplines are used: morphology, syntax and, of course, the lexicon.^
We could point out that by using the term "language" to name the mythical whole, Levi-Strauss was thinking about language as a system, in the sense of Saussure, and thus as a Virtual device of differences and oppositions that each discourse mobilizes and actualizes. However, it is not a connection of this idnd that is assumed between myths, but -in a much more interesting way -a relarion of transformation. The great originality of Levi-Strauss -by which he completely renewed the issue of myths and symbolism -was that he liberated the study from the task of extracting significations, at least those which ancient hermeneutic traditions of interpretadon tried to estabüsh. Or, more accurately, the question of the sense of the narrarives is no longer separable from the way in which they build a universe. What matters, thus, is their coherence, their capacity to integrate the greatest diversity of elements and experiences in the system. The rigorous task of the mythologist, according to Levi-Strauss, is to expose this device and not to comment on it. To State what this principle "signifies" -if we still allow this term -amounts to understanding how it produces an intelligible order by taking over the contingent materials presented.
Indeed, Levi-Strauss sensed the difficulües related to the use of the linguistic model and of the concept of signification associated with it (since all discourse aims at expressing a message). He did not explicidy formulate himself the general narrative models that can apply to any sort of tales, instead of starting from different tales and from their particular contexts to be able to draw recurrent relations, i.e. structures. Propp wanted to discover molds in which he could fit all sorts of Contents. Levi-Strauss argues that Contents -the lexicon -are always contingent, not deductible. On the other hand, the kinds of relations between these Contents show an ability of ordering, assuming logical Operations that are the same of all human minds. The structural approach is thus the most attentive to the materiality of facts and of empirical data, while being the most ambitious about the intelligence that is displayed even in the most ordinary experiences of life: from cookery to initiation rituals, from marriage to the narration of myths.
reasons for these difficulries. But he found a way out by resorting to another model: music. Everything seems to show that he has remarkably solved a problem without really having perceived the facts, nor therefore suffidendy fonnulated the Solution. Hence the obscurity of certain formulations, which are extraordinarily intuitive and yet unsatisfactory in their methodological wording. It shall be up to us to clarify the issues.
Reasons and resources of the musical model
It would be inaccurate to State, as others have done, that with the Mytholo^ues Levi-Strauss goes from the linguisric model, which had prevailed untU then, to a musical model. This is only partially tme in that it is still indeed the model of language as a system, on the methodoloffcal level, that remains relevant: it gives the f^theme an analogous status to that of the phoneme, that is to say, it makes it a minimal unit, purely differential, oppositional and semantically empty. Why, then, resort to music?
Levi-Strauss seems to demand from music to provide him with a model of exposition. He explains himself as to this choice in the introduction (named "Ouverture") of the Mythologques, and he retums to it in his general conclusion (named "Finale"). We should nodce that after having chosen to name the different parts or moments of his outline as musical genres ("The 'Good Manners' Sonata", "Fugue of the Five Senses", "A Short Symphony", etc.) Levi-Strauss abandons this practice in the following volumes, as he would have had to simulate excessively, in an explanatory discourse, a form of language depending on a given art. However, this form of exposition would recurrendy prove something eise that Levi-Strauss had sensed but apparendy did not clearly identify: it is also a form of analysis, or rather it is what makes inoperative, indeed iUegitimate, the traditional forms of analyzing myths. In fact, for LeviStrauss we cannot comment on myths without pretending to know more than them, without conferring a significadon that exceeds them and that is external to them; which amounts to missing them, not understanding them. From this perspective, music provides a good example: a musician "understands" and "analyzes" a given piece not by unfolding a discourse about it (which is legitimate on another level) but by taking it up again and by tran^orming it in a new composition. By asserting the same about mythical narrative, Levi-Strauss identified it, without saying so, with a symbolicprocess.
The whole question is in fact how a meta-language -a critical discoursecan intervene on or account for such a process: can meta-language dissect it without necessarily missing it? Or even expose it without necessarily taldng part in it? Outside? Inside? We shall see how Levi-Strauss struggled with this dilemma and how he asked music to offer him the niodel of a Solution.
But let US retum to the problem of exposition; we shall see that it leads to that of symboiism. As all narratives do, the myth integrates a synchrony/diachrony Opposition. It presents a succession of events and actions. It is narration. Such is its melodic line. But this line is not yet all there is to it. Narrative implies a multitude of levels which Levi-Strauss names codes (for example: technical code, cosmic code, marriage code, culinary code, botanical Code, zoological code, etc.). Thus as a polyphonic piece, the myth ought to be read not only linearly (enchainment of narrative sequences, analogous to a melodic suite) but also from top to bottom (the codes or semanüc strata in the myth are comparable to the harmonic levels of the musical composition). This analogy with respect to the simultaneity of the levels, already outlined in the 1955 article, is certainly the most visible one, but it is perhaps not the most interesting one. There is another more important relation, which concerns language and time.
Both myth and music can be said to be languages under this precise consideration that they ensure communication between those who listen to them (which presumes -initial condition of all language -a stability of the signs within a given Community). The analogy stops there, since unlike articulated language music is not in position to generate a signified {signifii) that, without detaching itself from the signifier {signifiant), does not however merge with it. Language produces significations, which the subject can abstract from the act of enunciation. Music, by contrast, always captures the listener immediately within and by the sound matter; it only exists in the Performance. Now, it is through analogous ways, says Levi-Strauss, that myth, while pertaining to articulated language, produces its effect. What does this mean? This: the narrative of the myth, just like the Performance of music, only exists as it unfolds in a temporal succession. Through the processing of sounds, which are chosen and used following tonal scales, music incessandy mobilizes the physiological rhythms of the listener, creating expectations, pauses, tensions and their solutions. This direcdy sensorial action is at the same time the intelligible Operation of music. No signified (as is the case of articulated language) detaches itself from it which would enable its translation into another code.
How does mythical narrative emerge for this model? It cannot be from the angle of its belonging to ordinary language (whose syntax and lexicon it does not disrupt). Thus this can only happen on another level, which makes language enter into another system or into another dimension. On the one hand, listening to a myth, like listening to music, unfolds in an irreversible time and yet it "transmutes the segment devoted to listening to it into a synchronic totality, enclosed within itself'.^ But this likeness of temporality (which begins in the physiological rhythms) is paired with another one, namely producing the unity of the intelligible and the 'sensible'. At the very level of figures and in a multiplicity of natural elements, the myth enunciates a logic, a cosmology, a sociology, an ethic, an aesthetic, etc. Going through the narrative sequences, going beyond them, the listener is faced with this simultaneity of schemes as a device of thought inherent to the events and to the images evoked. It is this immediate 'meaning-experience' as sensation and as knowledge that brings myth and music doser together. Between the two forms, however, there is a fundamental difference of application: "Just as music makes the individual conscious of his physiological rootedness, mythology makes him aware of his roots in Society. The former hits us in the guts; the latter, we might say, appeals to our group instinct. And to do this, they make use of those extraordinarily subde cultural mechanisms: musical Instruments and mythic pattems".® It is thus important to understand this use of the musical model, if we want to grasp the coherence of the thought process proposed and put into practice by Levi-Strauss, who finally justifies it well when he claims that what is specific to myth, just like what is particular about music, is that it cannot be transposed or translated into another signifying system. Can music, whose "peculiar quality is to express what can be said in no other way"', be related with myth, which is enunciated in language? On what level can we reveal an isomorphism? It can only be on a meta-linguistic level, that of the narrative system. It is only on this level that the myth operates on time in an identical way of that of music. Why? Because what is peculiar about such an Operation is that it is not replaceable, it does not exist in any way other than as Performance. In other words, it exists only for its addressee and during the time of its accomplishment:
"In both instances the same reversal of the relation between transmitter and receiver can be observed, since in the last resort the latter finds himself signified by the message from the former: music has its being in me, I listen to myself 
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TNEMVmOLOGIQUES | 31 as a melody is only translatable into another which retains a relarion of homology with it".'^ Now, by presenring myths (and their devices) in this way, Levi-Strauss, without admitting it himself, was doing nothing but defining them as a symbolkprocess, which is characterized essentially by its operatory power. annuUing the specificity of symbolism while keeping this evident question unanswered: why does symbolism exist, if it must be reduced to something 13 l.'Hamme nu, op.cit. p. 577. [English transladon: The NakedMan, op. cit., p. 646.) 14 Ducrot & Todorov (1972 This is precisely what Levi-Strauss calls "untamed thinking" ("la pensee sauvage"). This is how he goes about the use of natural species for introducing a system of differentiations in human society (what was traditionally called a "totemism"). This is also the case of a ritual, which does not aim at saying something, but at keeping or modifying the course of things. Finally it is also the case of sequences and levels of a group of mythical narratives, which do not aim at expressing the world, but at organizing it.'' In front of the facts of symboUsm, the traditional questions of semiology (like those of hermeneutics) consisted of asking oneself: what does this mean? In short: what is the message of this Code? Now, the problem is not to know what the symbolic elements signify (because this would be confusing them with signs), but to understand their function. Levi-Strauss clearly says so: "Of the sun and the moon, the same thing can be said as of the coundess natural beings that mythical thought manipulates: mythical thought does not seek to give them a meaning -it expresses itself through them",^" that is to say, it exposes itself as such; or rather, it operates thanks to them. A myth (or rather a group of myths) organizes elements, it builds an order.
It has no meaning by itself, it is at the most what makes a meaning possible by the composition it produces: "A myth proposes a grid, definable only by its rules of construction. For the participants in the culture to which the myth belongs, this grid confers a meaning, not to the myth itself but to everything eise: that is, to the Images of the world, sodety, and its history, of which the members of the group are more or less aware, as well as to the questions with which these various objects confront the participants. In general, these scattered elements fail to link up and usually coUide with one another. The matrix of intelligibility supplied by myths allows us to articulate those elements in a coherent system".^ It is the discovery of this performativity of the mythical narrative that has very evidendy led Levi-Strauss to underline the analogy between myth and music, and to suggest the fading of the mythologist before his object, since we cannot do the exegesis of a myth without dissolving it, and the only possible task is to restore its operatory device. Hence no longer resorting to a discipline like linguistics, but to an art like music.
Conclusion: the position of the interpreter
Myths relate to each other like the pieces of a device, not like references from signified to signified. They do not aim at saying but at organizing and transforming. It is in this sense that they "think each other" and even that they "think themselves in us" beyond our awareness. We receive them at the ver\-level where they operate. Wanting to give them a meaning instead of letting them ort would be wanring to convert the symbol into a sign, replacing a process by a signification. Exacdy as if we tried to replace a musical phrase by a discourse, although it can only be "translated" by a Variation, i.e. by a transformation regulated on the same level of forms (rhythm, tonality, melody, theme, for example): "Myths are only translatable into each other, in the same way as a melody is only translatable into another which retains a relation of homolog)'
with it".23
Consequent with this analysis, Levi-Strauss concludes that the book of the mythologist enters into the play of the variations of the narratives that it reports; or rather: this book confirms "the reciprocal translatability of several myths. This is why it would not be wrong to consider this book itself as a myth:
it is, as it were, the myth of mythology''.^-» A surprising Statement, which has caused numerous and very lively debates. This means that the "interpretaoon"
is not a meta-discourse, but that it remains an Intervention on the level of that which it is about. Interpretation also belongs to the system of transformations of forms into other forms. The position of the Interpreter as the one who could teil the meaning of the object considered, is thus made clear. His role is only to bring narratives in contact, to enhance their interaction: in short, to favor their reciprocal "translation". He is only a go-between, a catalyst of relations. We thus better understand the interpretative restraint of Levi-Strauss; a reticence that often disappointed his readers. However, while he refuses to take the position of the one who would know the "trudi" about the myths he reports, at the same time Levi-Strauss invites his readers to share a rieh experience: to enter with him in the narrative movement and to let themselves be moved by "the music that is in the myths".
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